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The Limits of Federal Arbitrage
Replacement Theories
KIRK PATRICK THORNTONt
I. Introduction
The use of tax-exempt obligations in municipal financing
has recently seen tremendous growth.1 The attraction, for pur-
chasers and municipal issuers, is the tax-exempt nature of the
interest earned and paid on municipal obligations; the purchaser
earns tax-free income and, because of this, a municipality can
issue obligations which pay interest rates lower than obligations
whose interest is not tax-exempt.2 However, not all municipal
obligations earn tax-exempt interest for their purchasers: section
103(b)' of the Internal Revenue Code disqualifies industrial de-
velopment bonds; section 103(c) 4 disqualifies the subject of this
Article, arbitrage bonds.
An arbitrage bond, in general, is a municipal obligation
which is used to make an arbitrage profit;' such a profit is made
when municipalities exploit the difference between taxable and
tax-exempt interest rates. For example, by issuing an obligation
which pays interest to its purchaser at the rate of seven percent,
t Associated with the firm of Breed, Abbott & Morgan; J.D., cum laude, Pace Uni-
versity School of Law; B.A., University of State of New York, Albany.
1. See The Bond Buyer, Apr. 4, 1983, at 1.
2. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (1976), which provides in part, that gross income does not
include interest on the obligations of a state, territory, or possession of the United States
or any subdivision of the above. The effect of this section is to benefit states and locali-
ties by lowering their borrowing costs.
3. I.R.C. § 103(b) (1976). An industrial development bond is a bond issued by a
municipality on behalf of a private business which is secured only by such business'
credit. The issuer lends the borrowed funds to the business directly, or leases or sells, on
an installment basis, property financed with such funds. Industrial development bonds
suffer from the same defects as arbitrage bonds. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the defects of arbitrage bonds.
4. I.R.C. § 103(c) (1976).
5. Arbitrage, generally, is "[t]he simultaneous purchase in one market and sale in
another of a security or commodity in hope of making a profit on price differences in the
different markets." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 95 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
1
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and reinvesting the proceeds obtained from such obligations in
other high grade taxable investments which yield nine percent
per year, a municipality gains a material financial advantage to
the extent that the interest rates differ. For reasons discussed in
full later in this Article,' Congress, in 1969,' delegated broad au-
thority to the Treasury Department to keep arbitrage bonds out
of the municipal bond market.
Clearly, an arbitrage bond exists if a municipality takes pro-
ceeds from a bond issuance and directly invests them in materi-
ally higher yielding obligations.' However, and unfortunately for
unwary municipal bond financiers, arbitrage bonds also exist
when it is found that the proceeds of a bond issuance replace
funds invested in materially higher yielding obligations. This re-
placement concept, created with the original statutory section in
1969,9 has emerged, since 1978,10 as the Treasury Department's
major weapon in its war against arbitrage bonds.
Section 103(c)(2) provides:
[T]he term "arbitrage bond" means any obligation which is is-
sued as part of an issue all or a major portion of the proceeds of
which are reasonably expected to be used directly or indirectly -
(A) to acquire securities . . . or obligations . . . which may
be reasonably expected at the time of issuance of such issue, to
produce a yield over the term of the issue which is materially
higher . . . than the yield on obligations of such issue, or
(B) to replace funds which were used directly or indirectly to
acquire securities or obligations described in subparagraph (A).1"
The problem with section 103(c)(2)(B) is how to determine
when such a "replacement" occurs. Simply stated, there must be
a sufficiently direct relationship between the note proceeds and
6. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
7. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 601(a), 83 Stat. 487, 656. See infra
notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
8. Generally, a "materially higher yielding" obligation is determined, by regulation,
in two different calculations. First, the "yield" of an obligation is computed. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.103-13(c)-(d) (1979). Second, "materially higher" is computed. Id. at § 1.103-13(b)(5)
(1976). A "materially higher" yield is normally that which exceeds I/e % of the yield on
the bond.
9. See infra note 87.
10. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
11. I.R.C. § 103(c)(2)(A)-(B) (1976) (emphasis added).
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the higher yielding obligations.1 2 This Article, by drawing upon
the legislative history and regulations of section 103(c), the rul-
ings interpreting section 103(c)(2)(B) and a closely related code
section, section 265(2),18 will explore the nature of this "suffi-
ciently direct relationship" and thereby illustrate the limits of
the arbitrage replacement concept.
Any discussion of section 103 must be preceded by an anal-
ysis of section 265 which provides the exception to the general
rule that interest paid or accrued within the taxable year is tax
deductible. This Article will begin by presenting the legislative
development and interpretive case law relating to section 265(2).
This review will include the concept of a "sufficiently direct rela-
tionship" which has evolved from revenue rulings and case law
to become a requirement under section 265(2). This term, as will
become clearer later,14 is extremely helpful in formulating a re-
placement model. This overview will be followed by a similar re-
view of section 103(c)'s legislative history and the development
of the requisite "sufficiently direct relationship," with appropri-
ate references to its counterpart under section 265(2). The Arti-
cle will then conclude with a model illustrating the limits of the
arbitrage replacement concept.
II. The Evolution of Section 265(2)
A. Legislative Development
Section 163 of the Internal Revenue Code allows deductions
for "all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on in-
debtedness."1 5 Section 265(2),16 which provides an exception to
this general rule, disallows deductions for "[i]nterest on indebt-
edness incurred or continued to purchase or carry obligations
the interest on which is wholly exempt from '17 federal income
tax.
12. See Rev. Rul. 78-348, 1978-2 C.B. 95.
13. I.R.C. § 265(2) (1981). Note that any ,discussion of § 265(2) necessarily revolves
around its application to corporations. Discussions of other § 265(2) applications are be-
yond the scope of this Article.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 67-70.
15. I.R.C. § 163(a) (1976).
16. I.R.C. § 265(2) (1981).
17. Id.
1983]
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The legislative history of this section indicates that interest
deductions should not be allowed if there is a purpose to use
borrowed funds to purchase or carry tax-exempt securities.1'
This "purpose" requirement has been part of the statute since
1917. The second paragraph of subdivision (a) of section five
reads in part: "Second. All interest paid within the year on his
indebtedness except on indebtedness incurred for the purchase
of obligations or securities . . . ."9
Section 265(2) was broadened to its present scope by section
214(a)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1918,20 which allowed deduc-
tions for interest expense on indebtedness except for
[a]ll interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebted-
ness incurred or continued to purchase or carry obligations or se-
curities (other than obligations of the United States issued after
September 24, 1917) the interest upon which is wholly exempt
from taxation under this title as income to the taxpayer."1
Two unsuccessful attempts, in 1924 and 1925, to amend
these sections solidified the "purpose" requirement in section
265(2)'s statutory scheme.2 2
B. The Interpretive Case Law
The first case to interpret section 265(2) was R.B. George
Machinery Co. v. Commissioner.2 The petitioner, having re-
ceived non-negotiable, tax-exempt deficiency warrants2' from
18. See infra note 21.
19. Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 50, § 1201(1), 40 Stat. 300, 330.
20. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 250, § 234(a)(2), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066-67.
21. This is a paraphrase of I.R.C. § 265(2) (1981). A broader statute, proposed and
passed by the House of Representatives, would have eliminated any requirement of
"purpose" or "direct relationship" and automatically offset tax-exempt income against
deductible interest expenses without regard for any relationship between the two items.
This version would have allowed deductions for interest paid or accrued within the taxa-
ble year on indebtedness in excess of interest received free from taxation under this title.
See J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 910
(1938).
22. See 67 CONG. REc. 2964 (1926); 65 CONG. REC. 7541 (1924).
23. 26 B.T.A. 594 (1932). See also Sioux Falls Metal Culvert Co. v. Commissioner,
26 B.T.A. 1324 (1932).
24. A warrant is simply an order by which the drawer promises to pay one person a
particular sum of money. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1421 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). The
deficiency warrants were debt instruments representing the money owed by the State of
Texas to R.B. George Machinery Co.
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the State of Texas and its political subdivisions in payment for
machinery, used the warrants as security in obtaining a loan for
normal business operations, since payment in the form of war-
rants had created a cash shortage for the company. The court
identified the issue as whether "the interest here in controversy
was interest paid on 'indebtedness incurred or continued. . to
carry obligations or securities . .. the interest upon which is
wholly exempt from taxation.' "25 Noting that the statute was
designed to prevent the purchaser of tax-exempt obligations
from deducting interest paid for borrowed money used to ac-
quire such securities, the court held:
[T]he exception in the statute should not be construed more
broadly than to effect its obvious purpose. It was not intended to
penalize legitimate business or to deny it the right to deduct in-
terest paid for borrowed money, which money was used for the
purpose of carrying on its regular functions. The warrants held by
petitioner were received in payment for goods sold and they were
apparently given because the state or its subdivisions could not at
the time pay cash. They in no true sense of the word represented
investments by petitioner, as it preferred at all times to get its
cash out of them. The fact that in making the loan the petitioner
hypothecated the warrants does not alter the fact as stipulated
that the cash as borrowed was for the purpose of operating its
business. It was not used to buy or secure the warrants in any
sense of the word.26
Thus the interest paid on the loan was considered to be a de-
ductible business expense. The court's reasoning revolved
around legitimate business reasons: the company needed money
to carry on its operations, borrowed money for such purpose,
and therefore did not borrow money to "carry" the tax-exempt
warrants.2 7
The term "sufficiently direct relationship" did not appear
25. R.B. George Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. at 597 (quoting I.R.C. §
265(2) (1981) (emphasis added)).
26. Id. at 597-98. See also Denman v. Slayton, 282 U.S. 514 (1931). Holding § 265(2)
to be constitutional, the Court stated: "The manifest purpose of the exception in para-
graph 2, § 214 (a), was to prevent the escape from taxation of income properly subject
thereto by the purchase of exempt securities with borrowed money. . . . It was proper to
make provision to prevent such a possibility." Id. at 519-20.
27. R.B. George Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. at 597-98.
19831
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until 1967, in Illinois Terminal Railroad v. United States.2 8 Illi-
nois Terminal, having obtained a large loan to purchase several
assets, sold one of these assets to a municipality for cash and
tax-exempt obligations. The cash was used to pay back some of
the original debt; the tax-exempt obligations, however, were held
and not liquidated to further reduce such debt.29 The Internal
Revenue Service argued that the indebtedness was "continued"
to "carry" the bonds; the taxpayer argued that "the bonds were
unrelated to the loan and instrumental to the successful long-
term financing of its business."30
The court began its analysis by noting that the taxpayer
erred in assuming that the loan funds must be traced to the cost
of the bonds, because this approach fails to distinguish between
loans "incurred . ..to purchase" and loans "continued . . . to
carry" tax-exempt obligations. "The real issue here is whether
the remaining loan, regardless of its size or correlation with the
cost basis of other assets, was continued for the purpose of ena-
bling plaintiff to own the Series 'B' bonds of the City of
Venice." ' 2
The resolution of this issue, noted the court, requires the
28. 375 F.2d 1016, 1021 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
29. Id. at 1018-19.
30. Id. at 1020. The court noted:
Because the proceeds from the sale of the bridge were used in part to reduce the
loan by more than the cost basis of the bridge, plaintiff argues, the remaining debt
must be identified with the other assets and expenses which were acquired or in-
curred during the purchase and early operation of the business and the additional
consideration in the form of municipal bonds represents appreciation in the value
of the bridge and, hence, is unrelated to the debt.
Id.
31. Id. See also Bishop v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 154, 160-61 (1963), aff'd, 342 F.2d
757 (6th Cir. 1965), where the court stated:
She did not repay the loan but left it outstanding. This is the generally under-
stood meaning of the word "continued" when used in connection with a loan. She
continued the loan instead or repaying it with the proceeds of the sale of the non-
tax-exempt securities, so that she would have the funds to purchase and hold tax-
exempt securities. This, we consider to be continuing the loan to purchase and
carry the tax-exempt securities. . . .The purpose of this section [265(2)] would
be too easily frustrated if a borrower could avoid its impact by the simple expedi-
ent of buying non-tax-exempt securities with the borrowed funds, then selling
those securities and using the proceeds of the sale to purchase tax-exempt securi-
ties instead of repaying the loan.
32. Illinois Terminal R.R. v. United States, 375 F.2d at 1020.
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establishment of a sufficiently direct relationship between the
continuance of the debt and the carrying of the tax-exempt obli-
gations." Citing Denman v. Slayton,3" the court set the stage for
this "sufficiently direct relationship" by stating that "a business
cannot escape taxation of income by the device of purchasing or
carrying tax exempt securities with borrowed money not re-
quired to carry on its regular functions."35 If the loan in ques-
tion was necessary to sustain the taxpayer's business operations
rather than to sustain the ownership of tax-exempt securities,
section 265(2) would not apply. 6 Here the court found, however,
that the taxpayer could have reduced the outstanding debt by
liquidating the bonds without damaging the corporation's activi-
ties;37 the taxpayer had a choice, and chose to hold the bonds
and maintain the outstanding debt.38 Therefore, there was an
obvious relationship between the debt and the tax-exempt
bonds: despite the taxpayer's legitimate business reasons 9 for
holding the bonds, it was apparent that the dominant reason for
continuing the indebtedness was the unwillingness to relinquish
33. Id. at 1021. The court further noted that this is a slightly different inquiry from
one used in situations where the issue is whether indebtedness was incurred to purchase
tax-exempt bonds. Id.
34. 282 U.S. 514 (1931).
35. Illinois Terminal R.R. v. United States, 375 F.2d at 1021.
36. Id. See also supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
37. The taxpayer, citing R.B. George Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 594
(1932), argued, correctly, that 265(2) does not disallow interest on debts incurred in car-
rying on business functions. The court, however, distinguished R.B. George Mach. Co.:
"[T]here the state securities could not be liquidated and, hence, the taxpayers had no
alternative for supplying their cash needs but to borrow money." Illinois Terminal R.R.
v. United States, 375 F.2d at 1021. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. See
also Wisconsin Cheeseman, Inc. v. United States, 388 F.2d 420, 422 (7th Cir. 1968).
38. Illinois Terminal R.R. v. United States, 375 F.2d at 1021.
Thus, a loan was not the only source of funds and was not required by the dictates
of successful corporate finance, but rather it was chosen by plaintiff as a more
desirable source of funds than the municipal bonds. Plaintiff's argument fails for
lack of purity of purpose in maintaining the loan, because it was continued out of
a concern for preserving the bondholdings, which could be accomplished only if
the debt financed the plaintiff's operations.
Id.
39. The taxpayer argued that the bonds were valuable as security for another bond
issue; the court countered by stating that "the issue is whether the indebtedness was
continued in order to carry the bonds and the beneficial use of those bonds (absent a
showing of essentiality) says little about this central issue." Id. at 1022. Further, "to say
that a large part of the debt was needed because it enabled an asset to be security for the
refinancing of that debt is circular, to say the least." Id.
1983]
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the bonds. Since "the total impression given by the evidence led
to the conclusion that the taxpayer had the forbidden pur-
pose,' 40 and that the requisite relationship between the bonds
and the debt existed, the court disallowed the taxpayer's interest
deduction."1
Wisconsin Cheeseman, Inc. v. United States,42 following Il-
linois Terminal Railroad, developed further this requisite "suffi-
ciently direct relationship." Wisconsin Cheeseman, which ran a
seasonal business, incurred cash shortages at specific times of
the year which it alleviated with short term loans. These loans
were repaid with receipts from each year's sales; the balance was
used to purchase municipal bonds and treasury bills. The trea-
sury bills were reduced to cash every July, while the municipal
bonds were used as collateral for the short-term loans. Eventu-
ally, Wisconsin Cheeseman accumulated over $200,000 in munic-
ipal bond holdings.48
The Government argued that Wisconsin Cheeseman could
have sold its municipals, instead of using them as collateral for
short-term loans, to meet its high cost seasonal business needs;
Wisconsin Cheeseman argued that the loans were obtained to
meet its financing needs."' The court began its analysis by stat-
ing that an interest deduction is not forbidden whenever a tax-
payer has the alternative of liquidating tax-exempts in lieu of
borrowing.4 Rather, there must be a nexus, or a sufficiently di-
rect relationship, between the debt and the tax-exempt bonds;
here the requisite nexus existed because the tax-exempt bonds
were used as collateral for the seasonal loans." The court stated:
Applying the rule that the substance of the transaction is control-
ling in determining the tax liability, the same result should follow
when the tax-exempt securities are used as collateral for a loan.
Surely one who borrows to buy tax-exempts and one who borrows
40. Id. at 1022-23. See supra text accompanying note 18.
41. Id. at 1023.
42. 388 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1968).
43. Id. at 421.
44. Id. at 421-22.
45. Id. at 422. "The Government has not convinced us that interest deduction can
be allowed only where the taxpayer shows that he wanted to sell the tax-exempt securi-
ties but could not." Id. at 422.
46. Id.
[Vol. 4:81
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against tax-exempts already owned are in virtually the same eco-
nomic position. Section 265(2) makes no distinction between
them.4 7
The court added an additional test which disallowed the in-
terest deduction even if the municipals were not used as collat-
eral for the short-term loans: the deduction "will not be allowed
if the taxpayer could reasonably have foreseen at the time of
purchasing the tax-exempts that a loan would be required to
meet future economic needs of an ordinary, recurrent variety."4 8
This test applied to Wisconsin Cheeseman: "Its regular business
pattern showed that it would have to go into debt each fall if it
bought or kept municipals as a long-term investment. ' 49 This
conduct, the court noted, clearly indicated that the underlying
reason for the recurring loans was to carry the municipal bonds.
The requisite nexus between the debt and the tax-exempts ex-
isted, and the court accordingly disallowed Wisconsin Cheese-
man's interest deduction.50
In 1972, the Internal Revenue Service attempted to summa-
rize the development of section 265 in one statement: Revenue
Procedure 72-18.51 The procedure classified section 265(2) in-
quiries into two categories: the requisite "sufficiently direct rela-
tionship" may be established either by direct evidence of a pur-
pose to carry or purchase tax-exempt obligations or, in its
absence, circumstantial evidence of such purpose."2 Direct evi-
dence of a purpose to purchase tax-exempts exists when the loan
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 422-23.
50. Id. Also in contention was the interest deduction for payments on a mortgage;
the court found only an "insufficient relationship" here: "We cannot say that a reasona-
ble person would sacrifice liquidity and security by selling municipals in lieu of incurring
mortgage debt to finance a new plant. Business reasons dominated the mortgaging of the
property." Id. at 423. If Wisconsin Cheeseman "had sold municipal bonds to pay for the
plant, it would have had fewer liquid assets to meet seasonal needs and would have had
difficulty in borrowing to meet those needs. Plant construction is undeniably a major,
non-recurrent expenditure and is usually financed over a long term." Id.
51. Rev. Proc. 72-18, 1972-1 C.B. 740. Similarly, § 265(2) will not apply to an indi-
vidual taxpayer's "mortgage incurred to purchase or improve a residence or other real
property ... held for personal use ... .because the purpose to purchase or carry tax-
exempt obligations cannot reasonably be inferred where a personal purpose unrelated to
the tax-exempt obligations ordinarily dominates the transaction." Id. at 741.
52. Id. at 740.
19831
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proceeds are directly traced to such purchase; direct evidence of
a purpose to carry tax-exempts exists where such tax-exempts
are used as collateral for the loan."
The circumstantial evidence test is that, in the absence of
direct evidence, section 265(2) will only apply if the totality of
the facts and circumstances supports a reasonable inference
that the forbidden purpose exists. 54 "Stated alternatively, sec-
tion 265(2) will apply only where the totality of facts and cir-
cumstances establishes a sufficiently direct relationship between
the borrowing and the investment in tax-exempt obligations."55
In effect, this test may be set forth as follows: the forbidden
purpose will be inferred if the facts and circumstances establish
a sufficiently direct relationship between the debt and the tax-
exempts. Further, the purpose to carry tax-exempts can be a re-
buttable presumption, such as when the taxpayer could have
reasonably foreseen, at the time of purchasing the tax-exempt
obligations, that indebtedness would have to be incurred to meet
future ordinary, recurrent economic needs of the business." This
presumption is rebutted by the demonstration of dominating
business reasons, unrelated to the purchase or carrying of tax-
exempts, for obtaining the loan.57 "[T]he purpose to carry tax-
exempt obligations [will also] be inferred [when the taxpayer]
continues indebtedness which it could discharge, in whole or in
part, by liquidating its holdings of tax-exempt obligations with-
out withdrawing any capital which is committed to, or held in
reserve for, the corporation's regular business activities."58
Handy Button Machine -Co. v. Commissioner" reinforced
Revenue Procedure 72-18's interpretation of section 265(2). The
53. Id. at 740-41 (citing Wisconsin Cheeseman, Inc. v. United States, 388 F.2d at
422).
54. Rev. Proc. 72-18, 1972-1 C.B. at 741.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Wisconsin Cheeseman, Inc. v. United States, 388 F.2d at 422).
57. See Rev. Proc. 72-18, 1972-1 C.B. at 743.
For example, the purpose to carry tax-exempt obligations generally cannot be in-
ferred where a mortgage debt is incurred to finance a new plant which is a
nonrecurrent major expenditure. In such cases, a dominant business purpose,
other than the purchase or carrying of tax exempt obligations will normally exist
and, accordingly, any inference will be rebutted.
Id.
58. Id. (citing Illinois Terminal R.R. v. United States, 375 F.2d at 1022).
59. 61 T.C. 846 (1974).
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taxpayers purchased shares of their own stock while simultane-
ously holding large amounts of tax-exempt obligations originally
purchased to meet established business needs. The cash pro-
ceeds of some of the obligations were used to make the down
payments for the stock; the balance of the purchase price was
represented by six percent interest-bearing installment notes.
Cash derived from subsequent earnings was used to purchase
more tax-exempt obligations; further, such holdings were less
than the amounts required to satisfy recognized business
needs.60 The issue was whether deductions for an allocable por-
tion of the interest on the installment notes should be disal-
lowed under section 265(2); alternatively, did the taxpayers,
under these particular circumstances, incur or continue the in-
stallment note indebtedness in order to purchase or carry the
tax-exempt obligations?
The court's analysis centered on the applicable legal princi-
ples: the purpose of the taxpayer in incurring or continuing the
indebtedness is paramount; further, this purpose may be gleaned
from evidence of subjective interest, inferences from the conduct
of the taxpayer, and the circumstances surrounding the perti-
nent transaction."' If these inferences reveal a sufficiently direct
relationship between the indebtedness and the tax-exempt obli-
gations, section 265(2) will apply.
Applying these principles, the court summarily rejected the
Commissioner's argument that "but-for" the borrowing, each
taxpayer would have been required to sell, or liquidate, its pre-
existing tax-exempt obligations; although the taxpayer made a
"conscious choice" not to liquidate, and chose to borrow, that in
itself is not enough. First, the taxpayer's holdings at the time of
the redemption represented previously acquired tax-exempts:
such tax-exempts were held as part of a long-established busi-
ness purpose - providing funds to meet established business
needs. Further, the income produced by these tax-exempts obvi-
ated the need to borrow to meet such needs. Second, the court
distinguished other "conscious choice" cases: in Illinois Termi-
nal Railroad, the proscribed purpose to continue the indebted-
60. Id. at 847-51.
61. Id. at 851.
62. Id. at 852.
1983]
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ness instead of liquidating tax-exempts to pay off such indebted-
ness existed when the taxpayer chose to extend or renew bank
borrowings which otherwise would have become due and paya-
ble;"3 similarly, in Wisconsin Cheeseman, Inc., the taxpayer con-
sciously chose to buy tax-exempts when, at the time of such
purchase, it was reasonably foreseeable that a loan would soon
be required to meet its business needs."
Therefore, based upon the total impression given by the evi-
dence, the court's ultimate finding of fact revealed that the tax-
payers did not have the proscribed purpose needed to invoke
section 265(2). 65
C. Summary
In order to apply section 265(2), one must find a "purpose"
to incur or continue indebtedness in order to purchase or carry
tax-exempt obligations." This "purpose" will be found if there
is a "sufficiently direct relationship" between the tax-exempt ob-
ligations and the loan proceeds. The collected principles,
gleaned from the cited case law and Revenue Procedure 72-18,
reveal the following analysis:
(1) Section 265(2) is not invoked whenever a taxpayer has an
alternative of liquidating the tax-exempt obligations in lieu of
borrowing; similarly, the simultaneous holding of debt and tax-
exempt obligations is not enough to invoke section 265(2). There
must be a purpose to incur or continue indebtedness in order to
hold the tax-exempts.7
(2) One finds this purpose by inferring that a "sufficiently
direct relationship" exists between the debt and the tax-
exempts."8
(3) These inferences can arise from:
(a) Direct evidence, such as when the tax-exempts are used
as collateral for the loan, or such tax-exempts are purchased with
loan proceeds;"9 or
63. 375 F.2d 1016 (Ct. C1. 1967). See supra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
64. 388 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1968). See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
65. Handy Button Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. at 851.
66. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 33-41, 45-46 and accompanying text.
69. See supra text accompanying note 53.
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(b) Circumstantial evidence, such as when one could have liq-
uidated the tax-exempts to finance what the loan proceeds
financed without impairing working capital needed for regular
business activities, or when one purchases tax-exempts with the
foreseeability of the need to incur indebtedness in the future, and
such indebtedness could have been obviated by not purchasing
the tax-exempts. 0
III. The Evolution of Section 103(c)(2)
A. Legislative History
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service began to receive re-
quests for private letter rulings regarding the tax status of arbi-
trage bonds.7 1 The Treasury Department began to view such
bonds with considerable concern: a large volume might be is-
sued, increasing public borrowing costs,72 crowding out weaker
public borrowers,'s and causing a loss of federal revenues. 4
70. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
71. See Surrey, Tax Trends and Bond Financing, 22 TAx LAW. 123, 124 (1968).
72. Id. Increasing the volume of tax-exempt obligations in the market generally has
the effect of driving up the yield on such obligations. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 200, 308.
In order to market an increasing volume of securities to finance these public
projects in competition with a growing volume of private borrowers, State and
local governments have been offering higher yields, and the differential between
tax-exempt and taxable securities of comparable quality has been narrowing. His-
torically, the ratio of yields on tax-exempt issues to taxable issues has been as low
as 60 percent but in recent years it has been close to 75 percent.
Id.
73. See Tax Adjustment Act of 1968: Hearings on H.R. 15414 Before the Senate
Comm. on Fin., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 91, 96 (1968) (letter from Assistant Secretary Surrey
to Sen. Long, Chairman, Senate Fin. Comm., testimony of S. Surrey) [hereinafter cited
as 1968 Hearings]; 113 CONG. REc. 31,612, 31,613 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1967) (remarks of
Sen. Ribicoff).
74. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 73, at 97; 113 CONG. RE c. at 31,613. See also
P.L.R. 8011094. "[I1f the interest exemption is viewed as a Federal subsidy, then afford-
ing interest exemption to arbitrage bonds represents a waste of federal funds, because
the federal government would lose more tax revenues than the municipality would be
able to realize from such transactions." Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 200, 308: Some state and local governments have misused
their tax exemption privilege by engaging in arbitrage transactions in which the funds
from tax-exempt issues are employed to purchase higher yielding federal obligations
whose interest is not taxed in their hands. The tax-exempt issue in these cases in general
states that the interest on the federal bonds will be used to service the state and local
securities. Someone who purchases a state or local security under such an arbitrage ar-
rangement has the advantage of a tax-exempt security with the protection of a federal
13
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Carefully analyzing ruling requests, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, concluded that the tax-exempt status of arbitrage bonds
was doubtful, and refused to issue a ruling. 5
Consequently, the Internal Revenue Service issued Techni-
cal Information Release 840,76 which announced that it would
not issue advance ruling regarding the tax-exempt status of mu-
nicipal or state bonds where
a principal purpose is to invest the proceeds of tax exempt obliga-
tions in taxable obligations, generally United States Government
securities, bearing a higher interest yield. The profit received by
the governmental units on the difference between the interest
paid on the tax exempt obligations is in the nature of arbitrage.
77
Technical Information Release 840 described two categories
of arbitrage bonds:
1. Where all or a substantial part of the proceeds of the issue
(other than normal contingency reserves such as debt service
reserves) are only to be invested in taxable obligations which are,
in turn, to be held as security for the retirement of the obligations
of the governmental unit.
2. Where the proceeds of the issue are to be used to refund
outstanding obligations which are first callable more than five
years in the future, and in the interim, are to be invested in taxa-
ble obligations held as security for the satisfaction of either the
current issue or the issue to be refunded.78
security. The federal government then finds itself in the position of being an unintended
source of revenue for state and local governments while losing the possibility to tax the
interest income from its own taxable bond issues.
75. See Surrey, supra note 71, at 124-25.
[Arbitrage bonds] guaranteed the holders of the bonds that the proceeds would be
kept invested in Federal securities, so that essentially a person buying the munici-
pal bond was buying an interest in the Federal bonds. Now this is certainly a
curious and roundabout way for one to buy a Federal bond. An analysis of the
transaction thus showed that the bond issued by the local government was simply
a conduit to investment in the Federal obligation. The Treasury thought that a
bond serving such a conduit purpose, though issued by a local government, was
not the kind of obligation granted a tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue
Code. Accordingly, it refused to rule on these requests.
Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 200, 308;
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 562.
76. T.I.R. No. 840 (Aug. 11, 1966).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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Subsequently, bills were introduced in the House 7  and the
Senate80 to remove arbitrage bonds from section 103(a) exemp-
tion status. The Senate bill, introduced by Senator Abraham
Ribicoff, was similar in both language and intent to the current
section 103(c): it defined an arbitrage bond as an obligation the
proceeds of which are, either directly or indirectly, invested in
higher yielding taxable obligations; furthermore, the bill requires
that such taxable obligations be held as security for the bonds.81
The Treasury Department, in a letter dated January 23, 1968,
vigorously supported the Ribicoff bill; 2 however, Congress de-
ferred action on this bill and the House version while it strug-
gled with the more immediate problem of industrial revenue
bonds.3
Congress finally addressed the arbitrage bond issue in the
Tax Reform Act of 1969." The House version contained a provi-
sion which simply denied tax-exempt status to arbitrage bonds;
further, it did not define the term "arbitrage bond" but gave
broad authority to the Treasury Department to prescribe regula-
tions defining such term. 5 The Treasury Department replied
that this delegation of authority was too broad, and requested
more legislative guidance.8 The Senate version, adopting a pro-
79. See H.R. 11757, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
80. See S. 2636, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. (1967).
81. Id.
82. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 73, at 91. The letter noted that arbitrage is a
profit from the interest differential between taxable securities and exempt securities; fur-
ther, arbitrage bonds distort the basic purpose of the interest exemption provided by
§ 103, which is to permit state and local governments to finance their governmental
functions at a reduced interest cost. Id.
83. See H.R. 11757, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. (1967); see also City of Tucson v. Commis-
sioner, 78 T.C. 767, 775 (1982).
84. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 601(a), 83 Stat. 487.
85. See H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Seas. (1969) (as passed by the House).
86. See SENATE COMM. ON FIN., TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM OF TREAsuRY PosoIN ON
H.R. 13270, TAx REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 118, reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 13270
Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (pt. 1) (1969). Specifically, the
Treasury Department proposed the following:
Treasury proposes that an obligation be considered an "arbitrage obligation"
if, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate the circumstances
(including but not limited to the terms of the obligation, the specified purpose of
the issue, the nature of the security provided for the obligation, and all other rele-
vant facts) demonstrate that the result of the issuance is the realization of an
arbitrage profit from reinvestment of the proceeds in higher yield securities other
than governmental obligations to which section 103(a) of the Code applies.
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vision almost identical to the finally enacted section 103(c), pro-
vided the requested guidance, defining the term "arbitrage
bond" generally and delegating to the Treasury Department a
broad grant of regulatory authority to carry out the purposes of
section 103(c). 87 Congress ultimately enacted section 103(c) as
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.88
The primary congressional purpose, gleaned from this legis-
lative history, was to eliminate the profit element which perme-
ates the use of arbitrage bonds.89
B. The Interpretive Regulations and Rulings Relating to Sec-
tion 103(c) (2) (B)
Section 103(c)(2) provides: the term arbitrage bond means
any obligation that is issued as part of an issue all or a major
portion of the proceeds of which are reasonably expected to be
used directly or indirectly. Part B continues: (B) to replace
funds that were used directly or indirectly to acquire securities
or obligations described in (A).90
This section 103(c)(2)(B) replacement theory was imple-
mented by the Internal Revenue Service in 1978, in response to
abusive devices designed by creative financial planners to cir-
cumvent the ambit of section 103(c).91 The Internal Revenue
Service, using the broad grant of authority delegated to it by
Congress to keep arbitrage bonds off the market,9" 2 issued exten-
sive regulations dealing with one of these abusive devices: the
Id.
87. See H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (as passed by the Senate). Interest-
ingly, the Senate explanation of the provision defined arbitrage bonds as including obli-
gations issued to replace funds which were used to acquire (directly or indirectly) materi-
ally higher yielding obligations. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Seas., reprinted in 1969-
3 C.B. 562. However, no explanation as to why arbitrage bonds were defined as such was
given.
88. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 601(a), 83 Stat. 487, 656.
89. See H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Seas., reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 200, 307-
09; S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Seas., reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 561-62; see also
City of Tucson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 767, 778 (1982); State of Washington v. Com-
missioner, 77 T.C. 656, 668-69 (1981); Fairfax County Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Commissioner,
77 T.C. 546, 558 (1981).
90. I.R.C. § 103(c)(2) (1976). See supra text accompanying note 11.
91. See 43 Fed. Reg. 39,822 (1978) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed Sept.
7, 1978).
92. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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invested sinking fund."
The invested sinking fund generally involved the following
pattern. Typically, municipal bonds had serial maturities: a city
would sell $10 million of twenty-year bonds, using property
taxes to pay off, each year, a portion of the principal. For the
protection of the bond holders, the $10 million principal amount
of the bonds would be paid off gradually over a twenty-year pe-
riod. A city which employed an invested sinking fund would not
pay any principal off until the bond due date twenty years
hence; however, the city would continue to pay property taxes
into a sinking fund, investing such funds in Treasury notes and
profits. This resulted in a substantial investment profit for the
city.94 The Treasury Department noted two effects of this in-
vested sinking fund: first, the purpose and effect of a sinking
fund is to earn arbitrage. Issuers were able to gain a financial
advantage from such funds because the arbitrage profit earned
more than offset the additional interest payment that had to be
made to holders of the term bonds. 5 Second, increased out-
standing indebtedness resulted from the use of such funds be-
cause the bonds were not retired serially; this would eventually
increase the cost of municipal borrowing used to fund traditional
governmental projects and thereby frustrate the purpose of sec-
tion 103, which is to enable governmental entities to more easily
93. See 43 Fed. Reg. 39,822 (1978). Advance refundings, beyond the scope of this
Article, represent a more complicated form of arbitrage transaction simultaneously ad-
dressed by the Internal Revenue Service. In a typical case, a state or local government
with bonds outstanding that are not presently callable would issue a new series of bonds
to "refund" the old bonds by using the proceeds of the new issue to purchase Federal
Government Securities which are then put in escrow for payment of the outstanding
bonds or the new issue until the outstanding bonds are callable. In such cases the state
or local government utilizes the profit from the differential between the interest on its
new issue and the return on the Federal securities to decrease its debt service cost. See,
e.g., P.L.R. 7947117. The Treasury Department noted that advance refundings double
the amount of tax-exempt bonds outstanding for any project, thereby increasing govern-
mental borrowing costs; afford holders of the older bonds a double benefit by having
them secured, in effect, by Treasury obligations held in escrow; and third, advance re-
fundings have been the principal cause of difficulty with the arbitrage regulations caus-
ing frequent changes in such regulations and, consequently a disruption of the tax-ex-
empt market. In view of the above, the 2978 Amendments to the regulations were
designed to eliminate the need for future changes in this area. See 43 Fed. Reg. 39,822
(1978).
94. See Fed. Reg. 39,822 (1978).
95. See, e.g., P.L.R. 8011094; see also 43 Fed. Reg. 39,822 (1978).
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finance governmental projects by providing them with a lower
borrowing cost. 6
To combat this circumvention of section 103, the Internal
Revenue Service promulgated regulation 1.103-13(g) which pro-
vides in part, that amounts contributed to a sinking fund" for
an issue are treated as, or "replace," proceeds of the issue: such
funds are therefore subject to arbitrage yield restrictions."
Following the release of this proposed regulation, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service issued Revenue Rulings 78-348, 99 78-349100
and 80-13's' which all aided in clarifying the arbitrage replace-
ment concept.
Revenue Ruling 78-348, in providing the foundation for dis-
cerning the relationship between sections 265(2) and
103(c)(2)(B), introduced the "sufficiently direct relationship"
concept under section 265(2) into the arbitrage replacement
area. The ruling, in assessing whether certain securities pledged
as collateral for municipal bonds were subject to arbitrage yield
restrictions, reasoned that the replacement theory does not ap-
ply in every instance in which the higher-yielding securities
could have been liquidated as an alternative to issuing the
bonds: a requisite "nexus" or "sufficiently direct relationship"
must exist between the bonds and the higher yielding securi-
ties. 10 2 The requisite "nexus" does exist when the higher yielding
securities are pledged as collateral for the bonds.
An issuer that borrows to invest in higher-yielding securities and
one that borrows against such securities already owned are in vir-
tually the same economic position. Compare Section 265(2) relat-
ing to interest paid to earn tax-exempt income, and see especially
Section 3.03 of Rev. Pro. 72-18, 1972-1 C.B. 740, citing Wisconsin
96. See P.L.R. 8011094; see also supra note 72.
97. Regulation 1.103-13(g)(2) provides that the term "sinking fund" includes a debt
service fund, or any similar fund, to the extent that the issuer reasonably expects to use
the fund to pay principal or interest on the issue. Tress. Reg. § 1.103-13(g)(2) (1979).
98. The Internal Revenue Service, in adopting the position that the sinking fund
regulations implemented the replacement language of § 103(c)(2)(B), did not concede
that the accumulation of moneys in a sinking fund is not an indirect use of bond pro-
ceeds under § 103(c)(2)(A). See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-349, 1978-2 C.B. 96; P.L.R. 8011094.
99. Rev. Rul. 78-348, 1978-2 C.B. 95.
100. Rev. Rul. 78-349, 1978-2 C.B. 97.
101. Rev. Rul. 80-13, 1980-2 C.B. 53. See infra text accompanying note 117.
102. Rev. Rul. 78-348, 1978-2 C.B. 96.
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Cheeseman v. United States, 388 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1968).1"
Further, although the pledge need not be cast in any partic-
ular form, there must be a reasonable assurance that the collat-
eral is available if needed to pay debt service. 104 The securities
in question pledged as collateral were subject to arbitrage yield
restrictions. 0
Revenue Ruling 78-349106 provided examples of how the
sinking fund regulations of 1.103-13(g) would be applied: this
regulation, which illustrates another expression of the replace-
ment theory, provides that amounts held in such a fund, to the
degree the issuer expects to pay principal or interest on the is-
sue, are treated as proceeds. The nexus required by section
103(c)(2)(B) exists since the securities held in the sinking fund
can be expected to be used to pay principal or interest on the
bonds.0 7
In Revenue Ruling 80-13,108 the Internal Revenue Service
introduced a substance over form analysis to arbitrage replace-
ment theory, placing particular emphasis upon the economic ef-
fect of the transaction. There, a political subdivision of a state
proposed a fifty million dollar bond issuance to finance a feasi-
bility study to determine whether a hydro-electric plant should
be built. The indenture indicated that the bond proceeds could
only be spent to the extent that the state legislature appropri-
ated funds to be deposited in an escrow fund: such funds would
be used to retire the bonds if there were a default or if the feasi-
bility study concluded that the power plant should not be built.
Both the bond proceeds and the escrow fund amounts were in-
vested in materially higher yielding acquired obligations.'" 9
Holding that the issue did not comply with the arbitrage
yield restrictions of section 103(c), the ruling proceeded with the
following analysis: first, during each year that the bonds were
outstanding, only the original bond proceeds portion matched by
investment proceeds and the legislatively appropriated funds de-
103. d.
104. Id.
105. Id. See also P.L.R. 8128057; P.L.R. 8028077.
106. Rev. Rul. 78-349, 1978-2 C.B. 97.
107. Id. See also P.L.R. 7912098.
108. Rev. Rul. 80-13, 1980-1 C.B. 27.
109. Id. at 27-28.
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posited in the escrow fund could be cited to finance the annual
cost of the feasibility study; therefore, the sum of the amounts
held in the bond accounts and the escrow fund could never ex-
ceed the face amount of the bonds. Second, the bondholders
would look to the escrow fund and the bond funds, and not to
the state authority, for debt service because the political subdi-
vision had neither assets nor revenues.
Therefore, although the form of the transaction is that the bond
proceeds will be used to fund the feasibility study, the substance
of the transaction is that the feasibility study will be funded only
by the earnings on the original bond proceeds and amounts ap-
propriated by the legislature of M and the earnings thereon, and
none of the original bond proceeds will be spent for the study.
Thus the transaction is the equivalent of M issuing the bonds and
placing the proceeds in escrow and financing the feasibility study
on a year to year basis with the amounts appropriated by the leg-
islature and the earnings on both the appropriations and the orig-
inal bond proceeds. 110
Consequently, the proposed bond proceeds replaced, under sec-
tion 103(c)(2)(B), the amounts held in the escrow fund.
Two very closely related arbitrage concepts also turned the
described issuance into an arbitrage bond: over-issuance and ar-
tifice or device. The Internal Revenue Service has set forth regu-
lations and revenue rulings pertaining to these concepts. It is
clear that if the state authority had issued the bonds in Revenue
Ruling 80-13, placed the proceeds in escrow, and invested them
to obtain arbitrage profits, such issuance would be considered to
have no governmental purpose within the meaning of regulation
1.103-13(b)(5)(iv). 1 The form of the transaction, that the politi-
cal subdivision is issuing the bonds, does not change its sub-
stance; since the bond proceeds are considered to have replaced
the amounts held in the escrow fund, it follows that the issuance
of these bonds is solely to derive an arbitrage profit which is not
110. Id. at 29.
111. Id. See also Rev. Rul. 79-108, 1979-1 C.B. 75, where a city which obtained from
a securities dealer a 60-day loan of 300x dollars, securing it with city-owned U.S. Trea-
sury notes, invested the loan proceeds in an investing pool which earned a higher rate of
interest than that paid by the city to the securities dealer, was considered to have issued
bonds solely to obtain an arbitrage profit and thus overissued. Id.
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for a governmental purpose." 2 This lack of governmental pur-
pose demonstrates that the bonds have been "over-issued" and
therefore subject to special yield restrictions. These bonds, hav-
ing replaced funds invested in materially higher yielding securi-
ties, did not comply.113
Further, since the funds appropriated by the state legisla-
ture are sufficient to conduct the feasibility study, the bonds are
not issued for a governmental purpose; therefore the issuance is
unnecessary. In this regard, regulation 1.103-13(.) provides that
the employment of an "artifice or device" in connection with an
issuance of a governmental obligation will make such obligation
an arbitrage bond. An artifice or device is
a transaction or series of transactions that attempts to circum-
vent the provisions of section 103(c), this section, § 1.103-14, or §
1.103-15-
(1) Enabling the issuer to exploit the difference between tax-
exempt and taxable interest rates to gain a material financial ad-
vantage, and
(2) Increasing the burden on the market for tax-exempt
obligations. " "
Under the above regulation, the unnecessary issuance of
bonds creates a burden on the market for tax-exempt bonds;11 5
further, since the bond proceeds, having replaced the escrow
funds, will be invested in materially higher yielding securities,
the political subdivision has exploited the difference between
tax-exempt and taxable interest rates to gain a material
financial advantage. Therefore, the political subdivision em-
112. Rev. Rul. 80-91, 1980-1 C.B. 29.
113. See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(5)(iv) (1979).
114. Tress. Reg. § 1.103-13(j) (1979).
Examples of increased burdens on the market for tax-exempt obligations include
selling obligations that would not otherwise be sold, selling more obligations than
would otherwise be necessary, and issuing obligations sooner or allowing them to
remain outstanding longer than would otherwise be necessary. In no case shall it
be considered an artifice or device to invest bond proceeds (or amounts treated as
bond proceeds) at a materially higher yield if specifically provided for in Section
103(c)(4).
Id.
115. See supra text following note 93 and notes 94-98 and accompanying text re-
garding discussion of same concept regarding the sinking fund and advance refunding
regulations.
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ployed an "artifice or device" in connection with this issuance,
and the bond is an arbitrage bond.'16
Revenue Ruling 80-328"1 described the arbitrage implica-
tions of a situation where a political subdivision contemporane-
ously issued short-term notes, paying interest at seven percent,
and long-term bonds, paying interest at nine percent, to finance
governmental projects. The short-term notes were used to
finance the project; generally, the bond proceeds were invested
and held as security for the bond holders until the project was
completed. The Internal Revenue Service employed a compre-
hensive analysis in ruling that the interest on the notes was not
tax-exempt, since the notes were arbitrage bonds."'
First, when an issuer issues long-term bonds and short-term
notes contemporaneously ... for the same project,. . . the pro-
ceeds of the notes [being] used to finance the project while the
bond proceeds are invested, the notes replace the bonds within
the meaning of section 103(c)(2)(B). Thus the bond proceeds are
replaced proceeds and have ... the same yield restrictions as the
note proceeds."'
Since the bond proceeds are invested in materially higher yield-
ing securities, the note is an arbitrage bond.
Further, general business reasons dictate that short-term
notes issued for a project usually provide interim financing until
long-term financing is financially feasible; an issuer who expects
to issue permanent financing in the form of long-term bonds at
the commencement of the project demonstrates that interim
financing in the form of short-term notes is unnecessary for the
project. Therefore, the notes are over-issued within the meaning
of regulation 1.103-13(b)(5)(iv), and subject to the special yield
restrictions of that section.120
In addition, by issuing the seven percent notes contempora-
neously with the nine percent bonds, the issuers have exploited
the difference between the tax-exempt and taxable interest rates
to gain a material financial advantage during the term of the
116. Rev. Rul. 80-91, 1980-1 C.B. 29.
117. Rev. Rul. 80-328, 1980-2 C.B. 53.
118. Id. at 56.
119. Id. at 55.
120. Id. at 56.
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notes. The overall borrowing cost to the issuers will be two per-
centage points lower then it would have been if only the bond
proceeds had been used to finance the projects.
In other words, the economic effect of the contemporaneous
issuance of the notes and bonds is the same as if M and N had
used the proceeds of the 9 percent bonds to provide the projects,
invested the proceeds of the tax-exempt notes yielding 7 percent
in taxable securities yielding 9 percent during the term of the
notes, and used the arbitrage profits on this investment to lower
the overall cost of borrowing during the term of the notes by 2
percentage points."'
Finally, in issuing both notes and bonds totalling more than
twice the aggregate principal amount of the actual cost of the
projects, the issuers have sold unnecessary obligations and al-
lowed such obligations to remain outstanding longer than neces-
sary.12 2 The issuers, therefore, have employed an artifice or de-
vice in connection with the issuance of their notes. 28
Revenue Ruling 82-101124 employed the prior rulings "eco-
nomic effect" analysis, coupled with a facts and circumstances
analysis, in applying the arbitrage replacement concept. There,
the state government established a perpetual fund with the pro-
ceeds from the sale of lands and invested the fund in taxable
obligations. State officials anticipated that creation of the fund
would enable the state to sell $100 million of general obligations
without requiring increases in existing or future tax rates. On
the same day, $100 million of general obligation bonds were
issued.12 5
State law dictated that the fund's corpus could never be in-
vaded or made subject to any lien for any purpose; income from
the fund, $13.5 million annually, could only be appropriated by
an affirmative act of the state legislature. Average annual debt
service on the $100 million bond issuance was $13.5 million; fur-
ther, the state's annual expenditures, including debt service on
121. Id. at 57 (citing Rev. Rul. 80-13, 1980-1 C.B. 27).
122. Id.
123. Rev. Rul. 80-328, 1980-2 C.B. 57. See, e.g., P.L.R. 8107038; P.L.R. 8113030;
P.L.R. 8240050; see also supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
124. Rev. Rul. 82-101, 1982-1 C.B. 21.
125. Id.
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outstanding obligations, could not exceed the state's revenues. If
revenues were insufficient to pay expenditures, such expendi-
tures would have to be prorated except those for essential gov-
ernmental services and debt service on outstanding obligations.
The state government's operating account had an average an-
nual surplus of $3 million accumulated over the preceding five
years. 126
The Internal Revenue Service supported its reasoning by
citing the holding in Revenue Ruling 78-34827 regarding materi-
ally higher yielding "collateral." ' 8 Listing the following facts,
the Internal Revenue Service held that the state reasonably ex-
pects to pay debt service on the $100 million of general obliga-
tion bonds from the income generated by the fund invested in
materially higher yielding securities. First, the creation of the
fund and the issuance of the obligations, having been legisla-
tively enacted on the same day, were closely-related. Second, the
average annual debt service is four times the average annual sur-
plus; the fund will earn $13.5 million per year, which alone is
enough to pay debt service on the bonds. Third, the state gov-
ernment must pay the debt service on these obligations by law;
therefore, "the bondholders are reasonably assured that the in-
come from the fund will be available, directly or indirectly, if
needed, to pay debt service. '12 9 Fourth, the fact that the operat-
ing account only receives money from the fund upon the affirma-
tive act of the state legislature "does not prevent the application
of section 103(c)(2)(B), because all the facts and circumstances
indicate that . . . [the state] reasonably expects"130 to pay debt
service from the fund. Therefore, the substance of the transac-
tion, as opposed to its form, "is that debt service will be paid
from the income generated by the fund,"131 which is invested in
materially higher yielding securities; further, the bondholders
are reasonably assured that this will occur. The effect, then, is
that the state government has borrowed $100 million of general
obligation bonds "against securities invested with the corpus of
126. Id.
127. Rev. Rul. 78-348, 1978-2 C.B. 95.
128. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
129. Rev. Rul. 82-101, 1982-1 C.B. 22.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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the fund at a materially higher yield." ' Therefore, the proceeds
of the bonds replace the fund. 83
In addition, the state has employed an artifice or device"'
in connection with this bond issuance for two reasons. First, the
facts and circumstances indicate that the state created the fund
to pay debt service on the bonds; in a series of transactions in
which the state invested the fund in materially higher yielding
securities and then issued bonds, it used the difference between
tax-exempt and taxable interest rates to gain a material
financial advantage.'" Second, since the state expects to pay
debt service on the bonds from the fund, it is clear that the state
would not have sold the obligations if the income from the fund
had not been available. Therefore, the state sold obligations that
would not otherwise have been sold and issued them sooner than
would otherwise have been necessary.136 Consequently, the
bonds are arbitrage bonds under regulation 1.103-13(j).
C. Summary
Section 103(c)(2)(B) does not apply in every case in which
higher yielding securities could have been liquidated as an alter-
native to issuing the bonds.1 3 7 A "sufficiently direct relationship"
or "nexus" is required between the higher yielding securities and
the bonds.'" Such a nexus exists when:
(1) the higher yielding securities are pledged as collateral for
the bonds and there is reasonable assurance that such collateral is
available to pay debt service;139
(2) securities are held in a sinking fund and such securities
are reasonably expected to be used to pay debt service; 140
(3) economic effect - substance of the transaction reveals that
bond proceeds were not needed, and not in substance used, for
132. Id. at 23.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
135. Rev. Rul. 82-101, 1982-1 C.B. 23.
136. Id. at 21, 23.
137. See Rev. Rul. 78-348, 1978-2 C.B. 95.
138. Id.
139. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Rev. RuL 78-349, 1978-2 C.B. 97.
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any governmental purpose;141
(4) facts and circumstances, as well as the substance, of a
transaction, indicate that the issuer reasonably expects to pay
debt service from fund containing securities invested at a materi-
ally higher yield.142
IV. The Limits of Federal Arbitrage Replacement Theories
Having reviewed the law regarding the two relevant sec-
tions, the limits of section 103(c)(2)(B)148 will now be explored.
First, an arbitrage replacement model intended to illustrate the
extent of the coverage under section 103(c)(2)(B) will be pro-
posed. Support will then be gathered from the previous discus-
sion regarding the legislative history of section 103(c)(2)(B), its
published rulings and regulations, and concepts developed under
section 265(2)144 to illustrate the viability of this model.
The proposed replacement model is based upon two simple
premises. First, a section 103(c)(2)(B) replacement will occur,
when section 103(c)(2)(A) 146 is not applicable, if the economic
effect of the transaction, or series of transactions, results in the
earning of an arbitrage profit. Second, an arbitrage profit will
exist if there is a sufficiently direct relationship between the ma-
terially higher yielding securities and the bonds. These points
will be presented and analyzed.
It is clear that section 103(c), and in particular section
103(c)(2)(B), is intended to eliminate arbitrage profits.14 6 The
legislative history14 7 and interpretive case law14 8 could not be
clearer on this point. Further, because of the breadth of possible
arbitrage transactions, each analysis of such transactions has
looked to their effect, rather than to their purpose. 149 The reve-
141. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 80-13, 1980-1 C.B. 27; Rev. Rul. 80-328, 1980-2 C.B. 53, 57.
142. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 82-101, 1982-1 C.B. 21.
143. I.R.C. § 103(c)(2)(B) (1976). See supra text accompanying note 11.
144. I.R.C. § 265(2) (1981). See supra text accompanying note 17.
145. I.R.C. § 103(c)(2)(A) (1976). See supra text accompanying note 11.
146. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
147. See H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 200, 307;
S. Rap. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Ses., reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 561.
148. See, e.g., City of Tucson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 767 (1982).
149. See P.L.R. 8011094.
Section 103(c) is intended to apply to transactions that have the effect - as well
as the purpose - of producing arbitrage. While some of the language and rhetoric
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nue rulings, using a substance over form - economic effect analy-
sis, support this view: each Internal Revenue Service section
103(c)(2)(B) pronouncement makes it clear that if the economic
effect " of the transaction yields an arbitrage profit, 51 a replace-
ment occurs.15 1
It is less clear, however, "when" an arbitrage profit is being
made; here the definition of "sufficiently direct relationship" be-
comes critical. Again, the legislative history and the revenue rul-
ings provide clarification.
First, the concept of when the "effect" of a transaction, or
series of transactions, yields an arbitrage profit is extremely
broad. The legislative history and the revenue rulings demon-
strate that this is the focal point of the analysis. Therefore, the
term "sufficiently direct relationship" which is employed in dis-
cerning "when" the "effect" of the transaction is to yield an ar-
bitrage profit must be defined equally as broadly: a sufficiently
direct relationship must exist each time an arbitrage profit is be-
ing made.
Further guidance may be obtained by, first, exploring the
relationship between a "sufficiently direct relationship" under
section 265(2) and the term as used under section 103(c)(2)(B);
and, second, tracking a comparative analysis format for each
section to see if the definitional limit of "sufficiently direct rela-
tionship" within section 265(2) can be used to shape the con-
tours of the comparative term embodied in section 103(c)(2)(B).
Sections 265(2) and 103(c)(2)(B), although intended to
eradicate slightly different evils, are very closely related. Section
265(2) is designed to eliminate the double tax benefit which
arises when one incurs indebtedness to purchase or carry tax-
in the legislative history single out transactions whose sole or principal purpose is
to produce arbitrage, the legislative history consistently recognizes the danger of
transactions that have the effect of producing arbitrage, and every attempt to de-
fine arbitrage transactions has looked to the effect of the transaction rather than
its purpose.
Id.
150. See Rev. Rul. 82-101, 1982-1 C.B. 21; see supra notes 124-36 and accompanying
text; Rev. Rul. 80-13, 1980-1 C.B. 27, 29; see supra text accompanying note 121.
151. See Rev. Rul. 80-13, 1980-1 C.B. 27, 29; see supra text accompanying note 121;
Rev. Rul. 80-328, 1980-2 C.B. 53, 57; see supra text accompanying note 119; Rev. Rul.
82-101, 1982-1 C.B. 21; see supra notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 150-51.
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exempts: one may not receive tax-free income while deducting
the interest expense attributable to obtaining that income. "
Section 103(c)(2)(B) on the other hand is part of a statutory
scheme designed to eliminate arbitrage profits.154 The similarity
between these two sections occurs in the method used to locate
the existence of each section's proscribed evil. This similarity
will be discussed point by point.
The legal touchstone' " for applying section 265(2) is the
discovery of a purpose to incur or carry indebtedness in order to
purchase or carry tax-exempt obligations. 56 This purpose is in-
ferred from the existence of a "purposive relationship," "suffi-
ciently direct relationship," or a "nexus" between the debt and
the tax-exempt obligations.157
Similarly, the legal touchstone for applying section 103(c),
particularly section 103(c)(2)(B), is the discovery of an arbitrage
profit. " 8 This profit may be discovered from the existence of a
"sufficiently direct relationship" or "nexus" between the materi-
ally higher yielding securities and the bond proceeds.69
The analysis used to determine the requisite "sufficiently
direct relationship" under each section, appropriately simplified,
is a mirror image of the other. Basically, it proceeds as follows:
(1) Section 265(2) is not invoked whenever the taxpayer has
the alternative of liquidating tax-exempt obligations in lieu of
borrowing; a sufficiently direct relationship must exist between
the two. 60 Similarly, section 103(c)(2)(B) is not invoked when-
ever the issuer has the alternative of liquidating materially
higher yielding securities in lieu of issuing tax-exempt bonds; a
153. See, e.g., Illinois Terminal R.R. v. United States, 375 F.2d 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1967);
see supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text; R.B. George Mach. Co. v. Commissioner,
26 B.T.A. 594 (1932); see supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
155. Handy Button Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 846, 851 (1974).
156. Id. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text; see also Rev. Proc. 72-18,
1972-1 C.B. 740. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Wisconsin Cheeseman, Inc. v. United States, 388 F.2d 420 (7th Cir.
1968); Handy Button Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 846 (1974); Rev. Proc. 72-18,
1972-1 C.B. 740.
158. See supra note 89 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying
note 121.
159. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-348, 1978-2 C.B. 95.
160. See Wisconsin Cheeseman, Inc. v. United States, 388 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1968).
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sufficiently direct relationship must exist between the two."'
(2) Direct evidence of this sufficiently direct relationship,
under section 265(2), exists when the tax-exempt obligations are
used as collateral for the loan; the economic effect of the trans-
action is the same as if the tax-exempt obligations were directly
purchased with loan proceeds.6 2 Similarly, direct evidence of
section 103(c)(2)(B)'s sufficiently direct relationship exists when
the materially higher yielding securities are used as collateral for
the bond issuance; the economic effect is the same as if the bond
proceeds have been used directly to purchase the materially
higher yielding securities. 163
(3) Circumstantial evidence of section 265(2)'s sufficiently
direct relationship exists when the totality of the facts and cir-
cumstances reveals that the indebtedness was incurred or car-
ried to purchase or carry tax-exempt obligations.16 4 Such a suffi-
ciently direct relationship exists when one could have liquidated
the tax-exempt to finance what the loan proceeds financed with-
out impairing working capital needed for regular business activi-
ties. 16 Similarly, circumstantial evidence of section
103(c)(2)(B)'s sufficiently direct relationship exists when the to-
tality of the facts and circumstances reveals an arbitrage profit
has been made. 6' Such a "sufficiently direct relationship"
should exist when one could have liquidated the materially
higher yielding securities to finance what the bond proceeds
financed without impairing working capital needed for regular
business activities. First, this definition of "sufficiently direct re-
lationship" does not exceed the legislative intent of section
103(c): clearly, an arbitrage profit is being made, for under the
replacement theory, this transaction would have the same effect
if these securities were liquidated to finance the project, and
then were replaced with bond proceeds. Second, the revenue rul-
161. See Rev. Rul. 78-348, 1978-2 C.B. 95.
162. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 72-18, 1972-1 C.B. 740; see also supra text accompanying
note 69.
163. See Rev. Rul. 78-348, 1978-2 C.B. 95; see also supra text accompanying note
139.
164. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 72-18, 1972-1 C.B. 740.
165. Id. See Illinois Terminal R.R. v. United States, 375 F.2d 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 82-101, 1982-1 C.B. 21.
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ings support this definition: in every situation in which the col-
lateral was held to replace the bond proceeds, such collateral
could have been liquidated, without impairing needed working
capital, to finance the project. In effect, the collateral was earn-
ing an arbitrage profit for the issuer.167
(4) Followed to its logical conclusion, then, the concept of a
"sufficiently direct relationship" as set out in section 265(2) ex-
ists when it is apparent that contraction of the indebtedness was
not necessary other than for the purpose of continuing to hold
the tax-exempt obligations. 6 ' It should be equally clear, that the
concept of a "sufficiently direct relationship" under section
103(c)(2)(B) exists when it is apparent that the bond issuance
was not necessary other than for the purpose of earning an arbi-
trage profit.
Finally, two regulatory arbitrage concepts, "overissuance"' 1 9
and "artifice or device,' '1 70 further support the proposed replace-
ment model. A close reading of the revenue rulings reveals an
interacting relationship between these concepts and section
103(c)(2)(B): simply, once a replacement occurs, an overissuance
and an artifice or device will also be present.'7 ' The question is
whether this relationship works in reverse: first, the concepts
certainly are applicable every time an arbitrage profit is being
made; second, it therefore follows that the replacement concept
applies, in the absence of the applicability of section
103(c)(2)(A), every time an overissuance or artifice or device oc-
curs, since the effect of those transactions is to yield an arbitrage
profit. If a replacement has occurred, then a sufficiently direct
relationship exists between the materially higher yielding securi-
ties and the bond proceeds. Therefore, the sufficiently direct re-
lationship exists simultaneously with every overissuance or arti-
fice or device. This reverse analysis will be explored.
The concept of "overissuance" applies in situations where
the issuance, or a portion thereof, is not necessary for any gov-
ernmental purpose. 72 Revenue Ruling 80-328' s illustrates both
167. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-348, 1978-2 C.B. 95; Rev. Rul. 80-13, 1980-1 C.B. 27.
168. See Illinois Terminal R.R. v. United States, 375 F.2d 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
169. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 82-101, 1982-1 C.B. 21.
172. See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(5)(iv) (1979).
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an overissuance and a replacement. There the simultaneous issu-
ance of long-term notes and short-term bonds for the same pro-
ject, effectively doubled the amount necessary for the project.174
This overissuance yields an arbitrage profit: issuing notes not
necessary for the project and investing such notes in materially
higher yielding securities. Further, the economic effect is the
same as if the long-term notes had been issued just to invest in
materially higher yielding securities; therefore, a sufficiently di-
rect relationship existed, and a section 103(c)(2)(B) replacement
occurred.
The concept of "artifice or device '75 may also be used to
find a section 103(c)(2)(B) replacement. Revenue Ruling 80-328
again serves as an example. The simultaneous issuance of notes
and bonds was an artifice or device, within the meaning of regu-
lation 1.103-13(j), because an arbitrage profit was being made
and the unnecessary issuance created a burden on the tax-ex-
empt market.7 6 Again, for the same reasons discussed above, a
sufficiently direct relationship exists between such materially
higher yielding securities and the bond issuance: the economic
effect of the artifice or device is the same as if a portion of the
issuance had been used for a legitimate governmental project,
with the rest being invested in materially higher yielding securi-
ties. Again, a section 103(c)(2)(B) replacement has occurred.
It should be clear from the above analysis, that the applica-
tion of the "overissuance" and "artifice or device" concepts fur-
ther illustrates that, first, a section 103(c)(2)(B) replacement oc-
curs when the "effect" of the transaction is to yield an arbitrage
profit, and, second, since a replacement cannot occur without
the existence of a sufficiently direct relationship between the
profit yielding materially higher yielding securities and the note
proceeds, its definition must be broad enough to cover such
transactions.
173. Rev. Rul. 80-328, 1980-2 C.B. 53.
174. Id.
175. See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-130) (1979); see also supra note 114 and accompanying
text.
176. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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V. Conclusion
The uncertain extent of section 103(c)(2)(B)'s 177 replace-
ment coverage stems from the complicated nature of arbitrage
transactions and the statute designed to combat them, section
103(c). Congress intended to eliminate all arbitrage profits, and
legislatively gave the Treasury Department the authority to do
so. As there are myriad ways to earn arbitrage, so must there be
an applicable statute; hence, the replacement concept was con-
ceived, enacted, and developed. It is hoped that the proposed
replacement model introduces some certainty into this confus-
ing, complicated area.
177. I.R.C. § 103(c)(2)(B) (1976). See supra text accompanying note 11.
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